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MAY, 1948

No. 4

COLLECTIVE GUILT
FEW problems are beset by so many complications as that
of collective guilt. It raises issues in the social sciences, as
well as in social ethics. A volume on political ethics, which
in turn would have to be based on a discussion of the major
problems of current politics, would be needed in order to
provide an adequate framework for a discussion of collective
guilt. This article, must, of necessity, limit itself to a few
major aspects of the problem, and this creates the danger
that not all of the remarks which follow may be understood
as intended. The practical implications of a policy based
upon the assumption of collective guilt are, however, so important that an attempt to analyze the problem might seem
justified if not all pertinent issues are properly discussedeven if some conclusions are tentative, or do not rest upon as
large a body of evidence as would be desirable.
An examination of what has been said on our problem in
recent years shows on the one hand that those whose task
it was to guard the moral law against the influences with
which wartime psychology always threaten it, have, for the
most part taken a negative stand. Thus the Bishops of the
Administrative Board of National Catholic Welfare Conference in their statement entitled War and Peace (issued under
the date of November 17, 1945) said: "Justice demands the
punishment of the guilty, and reasonable reparations for
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damage done. But we cannot forget, or allow our representatives to forget that our traditional system of punitive
justice is anchored to the concept of individual responsibility." Similar remarks were made by Pope Pius XII on
several occasions. In his Christmas allocution of 1944, he
stated:
No one certainly thinks of disarming justice in its relations to those who have exploited the war situation in order
to commit real and proved crimes against the common law,
and for whom supposed military necessity could at most have
offered a pretext, but never a justification.But if justice presumed to judge and punish not merely
individuals but even whole communities together, who could
not see in such a procedure a violation of the norms which
guide every human trial.

In his allocution to the College of Cardinals on February
20, 1946, the Pope said:
Erroneous doctrines are current in the world, which declare a man culpable and responsible merely because he is a
member or part of a determined country, without taking the
trouble to seek or examine whether on2 his part there has been
any personal sin of deed or omission.

That such views are not limited to Catholics, or in fact, to
Christians, becomes readily apparent from the views which
Mr. Victor Gollancz expressed in these words:
Can you read the various stages of the argument I have
tried to set out, and still believe that all Germans are guilty?
Surely it is not possible. What, then, do these writers mean
when they say that "The Germans must be made to realize
that they are collectively guilty"? If they do not mean, as
they cannot mean that every German, including those whose
ashes we are finding, is in any ordinary sense "guilty", they
must mean that there is an entity namely "the Germans"
which is something other than the mere sum total of the German individuals who compose it; that this entity is guilty;
and that though this entity is something other than the sure
1
2

New York Times, Dec. 25, 1944.
New York Times, February 21, 1946.
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sum total of the German individuals who compose it, nevertheless, and paradoxically, just because every German "belongs
to" it every German including those whose ashes we are finding, is "guilty".
I believe that this is precisely what these writers mean. It is
a foul conception and indicates how very rapidly that depersonalization which is the greatest of all our modem evils,
is proceeding. Stemming from Hegel, this idea of "collective
guilt" is a throw-back, as fascism is a throw-back, to preChristian barabarism; .and that decent and intelligent men
should be solemnly discussing it is a measure of our corruption
by the thing we have been fighting. What is it that, in the
final analysis, makes it utterly impossible for the JudaeoChristian tradition ever to compromise with fascism? Simply
this: that for the one the ultimate reality is the human soul
individual, unique, responsible to God and man, while for the
other the ultimate reality is some abstraction-a State, Folk
or Collective which men have created out of nothing, and
which has no existence except in their own vain imagination.
For primitive man to think in terms of the collective was natural; for the fascists it is artificial; that is the only difference between them.8

It is difficult to find statements of the opposite point of
view based on similar authority, or for that matter, developed
with similarly detailed reasoning. When looking for those
who embrace the doctrine of collective guilt without qualifications-and without any attempt to conceal its practical implications-we" must, indeed, turn to the journalist and the
pamphleteer, who from time immemorial, have been more interested in psychological rather than logical proof. Typical
of the first group is Mr. William L. Shirer, who expressed his
views on the subject entitled: "They're All GuiltyL-Punish
Them." " In the body of the article, the reader will look in
vain for any argument which adds to the contention contained in the title. Or take Lord Vansittart. On one occasion
he seems close to facing the problem. He began by quoting
Edmund Burke's famous dictum: "I do not know the meth3

WHAT Bucnwwm.WALLz MVImxs, London, 1945 pp. 14-15.

Originally published in Look magazine; reprinted in "News from Belgium"
of January 23, 1943.
4
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od of drawing up an indictment against a whole people", and
emphasized that Burke protested against the absence of a
method,5 and that if a suitable method were found, Burke
might agree to a collective indictment. Vansittart himself,
however, does not attempt to demonstrate the existence of a
suitable method. He continues by simply restating his thesis:
There is no use in twisting Burke to evade the truth. You

not only can indict a nation; you cannot escape from doing
so. The appalling cruelty of the German nation, and its calculated causes, will be remembered as long as men go up-

right.6

When Lord Vansittart first published the booklet in which
the above passage appears, the New York Times, on Dec.
12, 1940, took issue with him in an editorial significantly entitled "Indicting a Race".
Thus the opinions of those who affirm, and those who
deny the possibility of a collective indictment are diametrically opposed to each other. Yet, this is not one of the cases
where different opinions are a matter of taste. If the proponents of the doctrine of collective guilt do not want to forfeit
their claim, they must prove that their contentions are compatible with basic legal notions developed within the confines
of Christian civilization. There is, therefore, a common
standard, by which, in the end, the issue must be judged.
If we examine the problem from this point of view, it
would seem *that according to criminal justice, as western
civilization has developed it, punishment 7 presupposes suc5 The context of Burke's speech, incidentally, would seem to indicate that
Burke confined himself to the emphasis on method because it seemed that this
was enough to dispose of the issue. See E. Burke Conciliation with the American
Colonies, ed. C. W. French New York 1900 p. 64.
6 LoRD VANsITTART, RooTS OF THE TROUBLE AND THE BLAcx RECoRD or
GERmANY, New York, 1944, p. 159.
7 Punishment is, of course, the logical corollary of guilt; when the comprehensive analysis of wartime psychology during World War II is made which some
time ought to be made, it may well result that the desire for collective punishment
-- so hard to distinguish from a demand for revenge-preceded the assertion of
collective guilt.
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cessive proof of two facts: first, responsibility, and second,
guilt. Responsibility means, in the first place, that a certain act could not have taken place without the defendant's
playing a part: the result can be "imputed" to him. Responsibility further implies a measure at least of freedom. Where
there is no freedom, there is no responsibility; ' where freedom is lessened, responsibility is lessened.
When we progress' from the notion of responsibility to the
notion of guilt, we make two further assumptions. The act
in question must have violated accepted moral standards; 9
and the person who commits it must have a reasonable measure of foreknowledge of the practical consequences, and moral implications, of his act.
These are the conditions underlying the applications of
punitive justice so far as the incriminated person is concerned. It is hardly necessary to state the conditions with which
those must comply who fulfill the functions of judges: They
must be reasonably certain to know the pertinent facts, and
they must be impartial. To ensure the facts being brought
to light, rules of procedure have been developed which give
full freedom of action to the defense. If the impartiality of
a judge is in doubt he is expected to disqualify himself; also,
the defense is given the opportunity to seek a change of
venue.
Proceeding from individuals to groups let us concentrate,
in the main, on the notions of responsibility and guilt, and
ask how they can be applied to groups. To clarify the issue
8 This issue was treated by AMsTOTLE, NicnoAcHxA ETics, Bk. V Ch. 7
(R. McKeon, T n BASIc Woaxs oF ARISTOTLE, New York 1941, p. 1015) in these
terms: "Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when involuntarily he
acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way; for he does things
which happen to be just. or unjust. Whether an act is or is not one of injustice
(or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness .. ." -The reader will he interested in the entire discussion on pp. 1015-16.
9 Here the legal positivist might disagree. To this writer, as to others, it has
always seemed, however, that notions such as guilt have their origins in religious
conceptions, and that any attempt to separate them from this basis leads to contradiction and confusion.
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we may distinguish between what, for lack of a better name,
we might call voluntary and involuntary groups. The former partake, to a large extent, in the characteristics of the
individual. An example is provided by a criminal gang. Its
members are responsible for their membership, because it is
voluntary by definition, and we feel justified in assuming
that the mere act of joining the group indicated a willingness
to commit crime, and that continued membership in the
group helped in the commission of the crimes of the gang,
whether there was any direct participation or not.' A careful judge will, however, pay attention to the fact that membership in the gang may not be as voluntary in fact as it is
in theory, the existence of slums, for example, may ultimately
be responsible for the existence of the gang.
Altogether different considerations apply to members of
involuntary groups, examples for which can be found in national and racial groups. Whether a person is born white or
negro does not depend upon his choice, but it has a great influence upon his subsequent life. Similar consequences follow from birth in a certain nation, such as the United States,
or England, or Germany, or France or any other country.
Generations ago Goethe said: "Amerika, du hast es besser"
--"America, thou art better off." He meant to say that living in America provided opportunities not given to others,
and likewise excluded dangers rather close to the nationals
of other countries. A few people may, through migration,
change the results, as far. as they are concerned, of having
been born in a certain nation. The number is limited through
circumstances, however, and has been more limited during
the past generation than ever before; the refugees from the
Bolshevist revolution in Russia were the last ones who did
not meet with the legal restrictions which kept subsequent
political emigration down to comparatively small numbers.
10 In this connection, there arise, of course, the juridicial problems of "conspiracy" which, however, are more complex, and more delicate, than was assumed
by the prosecution during the war crimes trials.
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In this connection there arises a question which is of decisive importance for the subject of this discussion. There
will be agreement upon the point that when we are dealing
with involuntary groups, there is no basis for the claim that
one is intrinsically superior or inferior to the other. In fact,
we have no choice but to assume that such groups will invariably "consist of all sorts and conditions of men", with the
same basic distribution of moral and intellectual aptitudes.
But must we not also conclude that if there is a marked difference in group behavior it is bound to have been created by
a difference in environment, in the shaping of which the present members of the group may have had little part if any at
all?
When such arguments and their practical implications are
taken up, we should be careful to avoid in our thinking, any
turn which may have been brought about by the influence of
wartime psychology. Therefore, in what follows this writer
feels obliged to argue along exactly the same lines which he
followed before the war. To him the problem seems in its
basic elements, identical with the one presented to him by
anti-Semites first in Germany, then in France, England and
the United States. In practically all cases I found myself
confronted with statistics purporting to show that the behavior of the Jews was different from that of their fellowcitizen. Such figures should always be carefully analyzed
before one accepts them even in part, but my answer was invariably independent of any detail. It ran along these lines:
Suppose your figures are correct. What do they prove?
Those who, in the course of history, accepted the Mosaic religion (so many of whom are not descendants of Biblical
Jews) were, for that reason alone, placed in a social environment different from that of their fellowmen. The limitation
in the choice of occupation, coupled with the privilege of
lending money at interest, was bound, in many cases, to lead
to a behavior which the rest of the people resented without
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being aware of the fact that they themselves had created the
background which would inevitably lead to such behavior.
Certainly such differences as did develop had nothing to do
either with religion or with nationality. There is the interesting case of the so-called Cahorsines i. e. Christians supposedly coming from the French city of Cahors, who were
granted the privilege of moneylending, and who were accused of the same acts laid to the Jews. Dante puts them
into his inferno together with the inhabitants of Sodom and
Gomorrha. Thus, when two entirely different groups of people were placed in the same environment, both behaved the
same way and were judged the same way. Is not the result
-and
the "responsibility"--to be attributed to circumstances, rather than to men? It is quite likely that in such
conditions a number of individual members of such a group
will do what they ought to know is wrong, and what they
could have avoided doing even under unfavorable circumstances. In such cases there is guilt and there should be
punishment. Even then, some of us can hardly avoid the
,conclusion: "There, but for the grace of God, go I." Speaking for the group as a whole, what reason do we have to
assume that our own group, if placed in the same environment, would have acted differently?
Certainly whenever the forms of" individual indictments
are transferred to groups one should bear in mind that a
social problem is involved. The impartialjudge will always
examine the "quaestio facti", as well as the "quaestio juris",
the question of fact as well as the question of law. The fact
involved in a collective indictment is a social fact, and it is
necessary to investigate the particularforms of social association involved in order to see whether the dual assumptions
of responsibilityand guilt are warranted.
What then are the social facts which stand behind what
we call "the German problem"? Evidently, the nature of
the problem calls for an investigation of what Max Weber
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called "Realfaktoren'. Under the influences of Marxist
thinking our generation is unwilling to see any environmental
factors except the class structure, and it will be well to turn
to pre-Marxian thought. In the United States we have only
to recall the great contribution to realistic political analysis
made by that classic of political science, the Federalist
papers. In numbers 5-8 Hamilton and Jay investigated the
relation between geography, militarism, and war. They were
concerned with the possibility that the new constitution
might be rejected, in which case the thirteen states would
either become independent, or group themselves in regional
federations. Jay emphasized (No. 5) that in such a case
"like most bordering nations, they would either be involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them." Hamilton, in No. 8 added that such conditions would lead to the development of standing armies:
Frequent war and constant preparation, will infallibly produce them (standing armies). The weaker states or confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves
upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. They
would endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and
resources by a more regular and effective system of defense,
by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at
the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm
of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the
nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the
legislative authority.

Hamilton's explanation could not have been different had
it been provided for the very purpose of explaining the historY of Brandenburg-Prussia. The standing army, and with
it the militarism of that country originated as a result of the
Thirty Years' War. Frederic William, "The Great Elector"
at the end of that war kept some of the regiments hired by
his father during the war, and built them into an army
which already during his life time served as a tool for the
destruction of the constitutional liberties of the people.
Furthermore, the ancestors of what later came to be called
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the "Prussian Junkers" fought this development 1 for the
same reasons for which the noblemen of England and of
France fought monarchs trying to establish absolutism in
their respective countries: they defended their own, privileges. The English nobility, not confronted with a standing
army (unnecessary due to the insular character of the country) was victorious; their French and German counterparts
lost. Ultimately, the losers were bought off; as officers and
bureaucrats, they became identified with the new order to
such an extent that it began to appear, to themselves as well
as to their present day critics, as their own. If we consider
the facts involved in such a social process from the point of
view of collective indictment, the count against the military
would be arrogance, and against the people at large, subservience. Speaking of the miltary men, Montesquieu had this
to say:
It is natural for mankind to set a higher value upon courage than timidity, on activity than prudence, on strenth than
counsel. Hence the army will ever despise a Senate, and respect their own officers. They will naturally slight the orders
sent them by a body of men whom they look upon as cowards,
and therefrom unworthy to command them. 12

Turning to the people, Hamilton in No. 8 expressed himself in these words:
The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government
to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant -defense. The continual necessity for
their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and
proportionately degrades the condition of the citizen. The
military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which
serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees
the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as
their protectors but as their superiors. The transition from this
disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither re11 For some

details see

E.

Hubrich,
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DEuTscHEs VERFAssUNGSWEsEN, Leipzig 1905, pp. 46-51.
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cALPnmosop

New York 1938 p. 627.
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COLLECTIVE GUILT mote nor difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a
people under such impressions, to make bold or effectual re-

sistance to usurpations supported by the military power.
Militerism, then, was, for Hamilton, not a result of sin,

but a social disease, which would break out wherever its
causes were allowed to develop. It is one of the advantages
of a sociological explanation of such phenomena that, with
the roots of the evil it also uncovers the remedy: not persecution of those who have been the exponents of militarism" (which is the way certain Allied representatives in
Germany seemed to interpret "demilitarization"), but elimination of the social causes which brought about the social
result. In the America of 1787 this meant establishment of
the Federal Union. In the Europe, and the world, of 1919
(bearing in mind that a discussion of militarism in regard
to Germany is much more pertinent to the period of the first
than that of the second world war) it should have meant emphasis on as much European unity as was attainable, and, in
view of the global character of the conflict, an effective organization for enforcement of world peace. Of the leading
statesmen of the world, several are of the opinion that the
job could have been done; Sumner Welles "4 as well as

Winston Churchill,' 5 have emphasized that the League of
Nations could have been made to work, and thus World War
II avoided. If we accept this view, its implications are obvious. While the remedy was available, it was not within
the power on one country alone to apply it. The cooperation
of several of the more powerful nations was needed; it was
not forthcoming; all of them have their share of responsibility in the omissions that followed, and in their consequences.
The fact that negligence and ignorance rather than ill will
13 They should, of course, be punished for any personal misdeeds of which
they might be guilty.
FOR DEcIsIoN, New York 1944, treats the
14 Su-NER WELLEs, THE T=
subject in the first chapter, entitled It Might Have Been.
15 Mr. Churchill has expressed this view frequently; the most recent case
is his War Memoirs, of which Life magazine of April 19, 1948 published the first
installment.
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brought about these decisions serves to illustrate the nature
of the problem: The new war was not simply due to evil men
and their plots, but in the first place to the omissions of the
"good" men, which set the stage on which the commissions
of the "bad" men could take place. Furthermore, if we want
to consider the distribution of responsibility (as distinguished from "guilt") among the countries involved, we
must apportion it in accordance with their power to act. Mr.
Churchill, in his memoirs, emphasizes that this power was
concentrated in the hands of the victors, who, in his opinion, by their failure to use it incurred the major responsibility for permitting the "unnecessary war" to become possible.
The peculiar characteristic of World War II was, however, tyranny rather than militarism. Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill often referred to tyranny
as the enemy. The President, as he explained in one of his
news conferences favored the suggestion that the war be
called "The Tyrant War." The New York Times commented: "The world is at war because of a new brand of
tYrants who plotted to use the instruments of the Twentieth
Century to conquer continents and reduce nations to servitude." 16
The problem of tyranny is even more beset with complications than that of militarism, and we can do no more
than to concentrate on a few of them, in the hope that they
will be sufficient to illustrate the nature of the approach required. We may divide the issues involved into two broad
groups: The responsibility for the origin of Nazi tyranny
and the responsibility for the crimes committed after its
establishment.
The reasons for the rise of Nazism are seen differently by
different writers. Yet, there are some factors on which there
is a measure of agreement. The first concerns the effects of
the world economic crisis. The Nazi vote in Germany varied,
16 Editorial entitled The Tyrant's War issue of June 4, 1944.
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from the outset, in inverse relation to the prosperity of the
country. During the run-away stage of the German inflation, in 1923, the Nazi strength reached its first peak; it declined immediately with stabilization and consolidation.
Hitler's next chance came with the world economic crisis.
In the elections of September 1930 his voting strength increased to such an extent that, combined with the Communist group in the Reichstag, which also increased sharply,
and on which he was always able to rely in his parliamentary fight against the moderate government of Dr. Bruening,
he could make the normal functioning of democratic government impossible. From that time onwards, all depended upon the effectiveness of the measures taken to stem the onrush of the depression. When we judge such matters, we
must bear in mind Professor Brecht's fundamental distinction between "error, guilt, and reasonable choice." '- No.body, except the Nazis and the Communists, wanted the intensification of the depression. Among those in power in the
countries which might have acted in the proper manner
there was, for that reason, no "guilt" - they committed
some errors in the sense that better counsel would have advised them against certain policies from the outset, and
they exercised a "reasonable choice" in regard to measures
which appeared reasonable at the time, even if thy did not
work as expected. On the German side, freedom of action,
was limited; although there was some leeway.'" The country which, at that particular time possessed the greatest
freedom of action - because it disposed of the largest
amounts of liquid funds, with which alone the fires of the
panic could have been extinguished - was France. The
French financial policy of the late 1920's and the early 1930's
has been severely criticized by some writers: Paul Einzig, 9
the most popular financial writer of the period, threatened
France with "defeat" unless she abandoned her "aggressive
'7

A. BRncnrr, PR UDE TO SmzcE,New York 1944 p. 34.

18 F. A. Hermens, DER STAT uND Die WELTWItTsCH
amSE,Vienna 1936.
19 P. EiNz o, FINANCE AND Pourics, London 1932 pp. 138-39.
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policy." Pierre van Paassen has given the following account
of the experiences of Dr. Bruening, who came to ask the
then French foreign minister, Pierre Laval, for financial assistance.
He (Bruening) warned of an economic debacle which
might, through its repercussions, drag other countries, France
herself, into a chaotic whirlpool. He named "the sinister
forces" that were waiting to take over the reins in Germany
if he should fail.
Laval shook his head. He would not even place Bruening's
request for a loan, or a moratorium, before his colleagues in
the cabinet. He refused to hold out the least strand of hope.
He led the German chancellor to the door with a polite expression of adieu.
It was a sunny day in Paris when Pierre Laval signed the
2
death warrant of the German Republic.

It is possible to be less dramatic about this matter than
Mr. Van Paassen, and to refer to other acts of omission or
commission during that period each of which formed a link
in the chain which was to lead to disaster within a few years.
The point to be made in this connection is that people did
many things the results of which they did not foresee, errors
on one side 2 led to errors on their other, and aggravated
their effects. So far as France is concerned, it must be added
that her constitutional position was all but hopeless; hardly
any French government could provide the leadership without which it was impossible to do what the true interests
of France herself as well as of her neighbors required.22
20

P. VANr PAAsss,

DAYs OF

OUR

YsARs, New York 1940 p. 130.

French public opinion, was in 1931, very agitated over the proposed customs union between Germany and Austria. From the point of view of the two
countries concerned-Austria had taken the initiative-the plan had many advantages, 'but, as long as it was a cardinal point of German foreign policy to
have good relations in France, French objections should have been considered.
Had Stresemann lived, he would have given due attention to such "imponderables";
his successor Curtius was a well meaning man, but basically a bureaucrat, without
political understanding.
22 I was in Paris throughout this period, and while I did not ignore the
21

financial mistakes and their consequences-DER

STAAT uND WELTWnRTScHAYrrsRSF

ops cit. Supra n. 18 pp. 82-8--I reached the conclusion that it was best to concentrate on the constitutional background of this policy. See my article Partament
und Aussenpaltik in Frankriclz, Hochland, December 1931.
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From the deflationary effects on world prices which the
French policy of this period was certain to produce, no
country was to suffer more cruelly than France herself.
If we look at the events preceding Hitler's rise to power
from the point of view of developments within Germany,
attention must be drawn to the constitutional weaknesses of
the Weimar Republic, which did so much to facilitate Hitler's "Trojan Horse" tactics. Professor Hearnshaw says
about the Weimar constitution that it was
eloquent of the political incapacity of the German people.
it was . . . above all cursed by the principle of proportional
representation, which is the devil's own device for rendering
23
democracy unworkable.
Not a few writers have expressed themselves critically on
the effects of proportional representation in Germany,2 4 and
there is indeed reason to believe that if the majority system
of voting had been used in Germany the National Socialist
party would have died of the anemia induced by repeated
and disastrous defeats 25 long before the world economic
crisis gave Hitler his second chance. P. R. was, and is, however, advocated sincerely as a means of strengthening, not
of weakening democracy. A number of countries not ordinarily charged with political immaturity, have adopted or readopted it in recent years, and in Western Germany this
was done, to the satisfaction of Mr. Molotov, who during
23 F. J. C. Hearnshaw, GRmANY THE AGGRESSOR THROUGHOUT THE AGES,
New York 1942, p. 260. Other weaknesses of the Weimar constitution have been
dealt with by Brecht op. dt. Supra note 17.
24

C. J.

FRIEDRICH, CoNSTIruTioNAL GOVERNM:ENT AND DEMOcRACY,

Boston

1941, pp. 286 if. A BRECHT, op. cit. Supra, note 17, pp. 47 if.; K. LOwENsTEIN,
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION, New York 1940, p. 120; G. H. SEER and S. K. MARCE,
GERmANY: To BE OR NoT To BE, New York 1943, pp. 41-2; G. BRIEFS, THE
PROLETARIAT, New York 1937, p. 293; H. VON BECKERATH, IN DEFENCE OF THE
WEsT, Durham, 1942, p. 252; H. Finer, THE CA*E AGAINST PROPORTIoNAL REPRESENTATION, London 1935, pp. 11-17; H. HAZLITT, A NEW CONSTITUTION Now,
New York 1942, pp. 69-73; E. KOCH-WESER, HITLER AND BEYOND, New York
1945, p. 39. D. Sternberger, Ueber die Wahl, das Wahlen und das Wahlverfahren,
'Die Wandlung, October 1946; G. Willms, Die Deutschen Laenderverfassungen,
Frankfurter Hefte, August 1946, p. 23.
25 For the details see F. A. HERmENs, DEmocRAcY OR ANARCHY? Notre
Dame 1941, pp. 214 ff.
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the Moscow conference had demanded P. R. for all German
elections, under the eyes of the military government. Representative Case expressed himself on the matter in these
words:
The War Department sets up Military Government. Military Government acquiesced in the decision, if it did not encourage it - and I am inclined to think that they encouraged it - that they should use proportional representation in
electing members of the Landtag and setting up the ministries in the various Laender, which certainly means that you
will have Communists in government, if26 they get a minimum
percentage of votes of the entire whole.
There is a third group of factors to be considered in the
origin of the Third Reich: The intrigues of certain people
which; on account of their melodramatic character, all but
monopolized the attention of writers aiming at the popular
market. The importance of the factor is real enough; it
clinched victory for Hitler at a time when one of the social
factors sharing in his success, the depression, showed signs
of abating with the result that the party had begun to disintegrate. The different groups of men involved acted differently at different times; General von Schleicher, for example, and the army men supporting him, first played a decisive part in the intrigues leading to the overthrow of Dr.
Bruening and then did all they could to prevent the appointment of Hitler. Two men without whom Hitler could
not have been appointed, are Von Papen and Dr. Schacht.
It is interesting to note that the Nuremburg tribunal trying.
to assess the guilt for "aggressive war", found itself unable
to convict these men. Yet, it would be difficult to find any
other two men who did as much to bring the Nazi regime
to power, - and by this time most of us agree that Nazism
meant war. The Nuremburg tribunal was tangled up because it attempted to apply the ordinary notions of guilt
and punishment to a nexus of social events which obeyed
26 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. on the Third Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1948, Washington 1947 p. 74.

COLLECTIVE GUILT

laws of quite a different nature. Von Papen and Schacht
were indeed "not guilty" of having promoted direct means
for bringing about aggressive war, but were they not more
"responsible" than perhaps any other two men for assisting
a political system to power which was bound to go its own
evil ways? They did not foresee the future, of course; they
hoped to use Hitler for their own ends and discard him
afterwards. Yet, they helped to create a chain of circumstances, and as a result of what they did, uncounted thousands found themselves in subsequent years in a position
where they were not strong enough - and where many of us
27
might not have been strong enough - to avoid "guilt".
Konrad Heiden, for example, concludes: "Hitler came to
power because he seemed the only man who could restore
Germany to a parliamentary government such as (President Paul von) Hindenburg had demanded in August, and
even more in November."

28

The atrocities committed during the Nazi tyranny have
caught the public imagination more than the complicated
social facts which led to its rise; in the indictment of the
people of Germany the atrocities constitute, in fact, the
major item. Few would want to deny the beastly character
of these atrocities, nor the need for stern punishment of
those found guilty of participating in them. Such punishment, indeed, is necessary if the notions of right and wrong
-

the only basis upon which civilized society can exist -

are to be vindicated. Our task is, however, not completed unless we give our attention to the social system which formed
the background of these atrocities. If Germany did live
under a tyranny during the Nazi period, did not this fact
entail the same set of consequences which tyranny has pro27 The different groups of factors which we have been discussing are not unrelated. The intrigues of the men in question-and of others, such as Oscar von
Hindenburg were possible only because the situation, and in particular the constitutional situation, was so confused.
28 DnR FUHEPR, Boston 1944 pp. 539-40, H. RoamEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT, St. Louis (19 ) p.
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duced whenever it existed? We must rid our mind of the
notion that what happened in Germany was unprecedented.
The laws of tyranny have, in fact, been analyzed in political
theory for more than two thousand years. Plato, in the
eight and ninth books of his Republic, broke the ground;
a number of others followed among whom St. Thomas might,
in recent discussions of this matter by moralists, well have
been given special attention. What these writers had to
say, 9 they took from the evidence of contemporary experience; if this should not be enough to persuade us that what
happened in Germany was, in its basic features, not unprecedented, we might do well to reflect upon what is happening in Russia, and in all of the countries east of the Iron
Curtain, at this very time.
Atrocities will, in short, develop under a tyranny because
they are necessary to its survival. Torture is an element of
terror; fright is to be stricken into the hearts of the family,
the friends, and the neighbors of the victim. In Germany,
the concentration camps opened their gates right after the
establishment of the Nazi system in 1933. Of the tens of
thousands who were imprisoned in the early years, hardly
more than ten percent were Jewish; the remainder were
non-Jewish Germans whom the Nazis feared. All were equally subjected to torture and deprivation.
Instead of attempting to discuss the moral implications
of the atrocities committed under a tyranny in greater detail, let us quote a passage from an article by Albert J.
Gu~rard, who expresses opinions on the youth of France
which, on the whole, are favorable, but adds:
This is not to say, however, that whole sections of French
youth were not corrupted. Darnand's young militiamen have
been shot or have fled, leaving only their sinister blue uniforms behind - those criminals who exceeded the Gestapo
in the ingenuity and variety of their torture chambers, and
who fittingly concluded their activities in France with the as29 For a summary see the chapter entitled The Pattern of Tyranny in my
book THE TYRANT's WAR AND THE PEOPLE'S PEACE, Chicago 1944 pp. 129 ff.
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sassination of Georges Mandel. But they are not peculiarly
French; no country, given the occasion, would fail to produce
0
its Darnand militia.3

The italics are mine; the general implications of the last
sentence contain the major thesis of this article.
A few considerations remain to be added. When the issue
of collective guilt is raised, questions arise concerning the
judge as well as the defendant. Where is the impartial court
which rule on the guilt of whole peoples? So far, at any rate,
as the prospect of punishment is concerned, only the vanquished can appear in the role of the defendants, and only
the victors in the role of prosecutor and judge. In the victorious countries, the trial is left to, or influenced by, public
opinion which, in the course of a major war, is bound to be
deeply affected by the sorrow and anger caused by huge
sacrifices of blood and treasure. Furthermore, the public
obtains, as a result of official and unofficial censorship, only
a part of the facts upon which its verdict ought to be based.
Facts have, in any war, been treated in a cavalier fashion,
and the latest is no exception. To give but one example: Dr.
Marshall Knappen, who served with the American military
government in Germany, informs us of his efforts to induce
a correspondent to send his paper a balanced account of conditions in Germany; he obtained this reply:
"I have a cable from the home office," he said. It ends:
"This is the way the German Situation looks in New York
and we hope it looks the same to you." "What do you expect
me to do?" Dr. Knappen continues:
It was widely reported that a prominent correspondent of
a large news agency received a cable from his office in New
York asking him to recheck his copy in the light of his organization's policy not to start a sympathy campaign for

Germany. In other words, the supposedly objective enlighteners of public opinion were given a prescription to which dispatches must conform. It was another example of the problem, as

old as Plato, of how to guard the guards.31

80 "The Tough Young Men of France," Harper's Magazine, April 1945. p. 468.
31 M1xARse
KNAPPrx, Awn CALL IT PEAcE, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1947, pp. 191-2.
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Dr. Knappen estimates that only about one-third of the
correspondents were properly qualified for their tasks, and
of this third he says:
Many of the important stories for which they gathered materials - such as some on the treatment of German prisoners
of war and internees in our stockades - they never published,
opinion at home was not ready
explaining that as yet public
32
for such unpleasant facts.
One cannot avoid the conclusion that, had the pertinent
facts been known, our public opinion might have been less
ready to support the verdict of collective guilt than some
of its sectors where on the basis of available information.
It is a further requirement of a just verdict that the danger of setting up a double standard be seen and be guarded
against; the decision rendered must be such that it can
stand comparison with the treatment of similar cases in the
past, the present and, presumably, the future. History
seems to suggest that the accusation of an entire people is
the natural concomitant of any war, and appears in aggravated form when the factor of tyranny is present. Thomas Jefferson, for example, in a letter to Albert Gallatin had
this to say on the people of France after the termination of
Napoleon's rule:
I grieve for France; although it cannot be denied that by

the afflictions with which she wantonly and wickedly overwhelmed other nations, she has merited severe reprisals. For it
is no excuse to lay the enormities to the wretch who led them,
and who has been the author of more misery and suffering to
the world, than any being who ever lived before him. 33

Jefferson's opinion - shared by many others - was disregarded by the peacemakers of the Congress of Vienna; instead the view developed by Talleyrand, according to which
Napoleon's system of tyranny, rather than the people of
32

Ibid. pp. 192-3-For a discussion of other influences, which had similar re-

sults, see F. A. HERmENs,

The Danger of Stereotypes in Viewing Germany, THE

QUAITERLY, Winter 1945-6.
PUBLIC OP ONio
33 THE COMPLETE JEPERSON, edited by S. K. Padover, New York 1943, p.
919.
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France, were to be blamed, was accepted. There was no collective condemnation.; the peace drafted was a must in the
interest of the French nation as of the victors, and it was a
peace that pacified. In retrospect, who would want to side
with Jefferson?
So far as recent events are concerned, the charge of collective guilt has been made against all of the axis powers
-as much as against Germany. What Greeks or Yugoslavs
had to say against Bulgarians or Italians was almost word
for word identical with what was said about Germany in the
Western countries. Charges against Italy were also made,
rather frequently, in England. The Economist, ordinarily a
model of levelheadedness, had this to say in an editorial
published on November 28, 1942, under the title: "From
Strength":
The people who remember that the Italians, like so many
Germans, are nice folk . . . forget for instance, that the

prototype of all that the Nazis have done by way of personal
brutality in their political career, in their Brown Houses
and their concentration camps, was the brutality of Italian
Fascism, which began its progress towards popular infamy
twenty years ago.

. .

'. They forget, in short, that it was Mus-

solini, not Hitler, who began it all, and that, whatever the
Italians may feel now when retribution is at hand, Mussolini
was given their backing when he was more successful. It is entirely wrongheaded to sympathize with the Italians because
they have proved so much less efficient in battle than the
Germans, or to wish to treat the first saboteurs of European
decency and peace as merely misguided and misled, simply
because some of them before the war sold ice-cream, ground
organs, waited at table, kept hotels or gave lovely parties. If
the people of Germany are responsible for Hitler's deeds because they have given his support and backing for one decade,
as indeed they are, the people of Italy are responsible for the
support they have given to Mussolini for two.

To quote this passage in 1948 sufficies to demonstrate its
absurdity. The editors of The Economist, when they judged
the Italians the same way as the Germans, did, however, *at
least have the advantage of consistency.
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A final point must be made: A policy based upon the assumption of collective guilt is sterile. It is negative, and, if
carried to its logical conclusions, it deprives the victors of
any partner among the vanquished with whom they could
deal for purposes of reconstruction. This was clearly stated
in the first discussion of the merits of a policy based upon
the assumption of collective guilt of which history records.
According to Thucydides, when in 42 7 B.C. the Mytilenians,
who had revolted against Athenian rule, surrended to their
former allies, Cleon demanded, and at first obtained, a decision in the Athenian popular assembly, that all the men
among the Mytilenians be killed, and the women and children sold into slavery. Diodotus took the opposite view,
and insisted that a distinction be made between the common
people and their leaders. He added: "Even if they were
guilty, you ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid
alienating the only class friendly to us." -1 Diodotus succeeded in having the earlier decision reversed, and thus
there remained a group among the vanquished with whom
the Athenians could deal.
Allied policy towards Germany during the second world
war was to provide the proof for the unwisdom of the op.
posite policy. The policy of "unconditional surrender" opposed, as we now know, by General Eisenhower, by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and the British Foreign Office
could in spite of its defects have been interpreted in such
a sense that would have been acceptable to the anti-Nazis
in Germany. Efforts in this direction were made, and they
had the support of Pius XII, who, in His allocution of June
3, 1944, 35 referred to those who were promoting a policy of
vengeance, and insisted that to those who were soon bound
to be the vanquished, there be given "a well founded expectation of honorable solutions." The advice was disreThe entire debate has a modern ring. See Thucydides, THE
Everman's Library edition, pp. 192-203.
35 The New York Times of June 3, 1944.
34
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garded, and the war went on to the bitter end. When Germany was occupied, all Germans were, in the words of an
American officer, treated "as minor war criminals." Thus
there was no friendly contact with any group, and genuine
reconstruction became impossible.
The doctrine of collective guilt has guided our German
policy in more important matters. Former Secretary of State
Cordell Hull 11 has rightly said. of the Morgenthau plan
that "it would punish all of them (the Germans) and future
generations too for the crimes of a portion of them." Also,
while in the words of Dr. George Pattee, of the staff of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, recent "policy documents make a pretense of differing from the Morgenthau
plan," essential parts of Mr. Morgenthau's proposals have
entered official policy, and, as Dr. Pattee shows, have not
even now been fully eliminated. 7
In addition, there are such matters as the expulsion of
fifteen million people of German descent from various areas,
which is as clearly based on the doctrine of collective guilt
as are the economic provisions of the Morgenthau plan. But
what has been the result of such measures? Germany was
made into the most gigantic vacuum of history, into which
now the victors find themselves drawn from all sides, and
the relations among them are now quite generally described
as "the cold war." A positive policy towards Germany, based
upon a clear realization of the part played by the system of
tyranny in Hitler's war, and the willingness to give to the
anti-Nazi Germans an honorable share in the reconstruction of Europe, might have presented difficulties of detail;
it could never have led to as complete a failure as did our
36 See the installment of his memoirs published in The New York Times of
March 2, 1948.
37 Report on Germany, By the Subcommittee on Germany of the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid (Herter Committee, appendix, pp. 29-38.) Dr.
Pattee's summary of the development of American policy in regard to Germany,
while presented in outline form, is a most, if not the most, intelligent discussion
of the entire subject known to this writer.
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actual policy, based as it was upon the assumption that if
only the Germans were effectively punished everything else
would take care of itself. To quote again Dr. Pattee:
"The consequences of this bankruptcy of American policy
are immense. Among the minor byproducts are the necessity for unilateral action in Greece and Turkey and the bankruptcy of the British loan."
The very fact that a policy based upon the doctrine of
collective guilt " has made another war a distinct possibility - makes it imperative that we discard it from our

thinking, and keep its implications from influencing future
actions. Let us turn away from shallow moralizing, and find
the way to real political morality. The right way to this
goal was indicated by Pope Pius XII who, in his address to
the newly-created Cardinals, quoted above, after he had
rejected the idea of collective guilt as one of the "erroneous
doctrines" of our time, continued in these words:
We may add that especially the complications of the economic and military order have made of society a huge machine, of which man is no longer master, of which, indeed, he
is afraid ....
The present is for many only the disordered rush of a
torrent which carries man like fish on its headlong course towards the night of the future in which they will lose themselves in the force that moves them on.
88 The term used"in the pertinent documents, such as the original Morgenthau plan, directive JCSI067, and the Potsdam declarations, is "responsibility"
rather than "guilt", but the intended implications were the same.
A number of Protestant, and some Catholic writers, have sincerely, and at
times very ably, tried to speak of "responsibility" in a sense different from
"guilt". (Their practical proposals were entirely constructive.) Considerations of
space do not permit a discussion of their arguments; suffice it to say that a time
when the term -"responsibility" is being used by others to justify measures to
which these writers would object strenuously, it would seem preferable not to use
the term. Besides, the arguments of Mr. Gollancz, quoted at the beginning of
this article, are as difficult to answer from the point of view of collective "responsibility" as from that of collective "guilt".
The reader of this article may, however, want to refer to Karl Jasper's THE
QuEsTiox o GERm= GuILT, New York 1947, and Max Pribilla's articles: Das
Schwdgen des degshen Volkes, Stimmen der Zeit, October 1946, and "Wie war es
moeglich?" November 1946. Some very discerning remarks are contained in the
article by Johann B. Schuster, "Kollektivschuld" Stimmen der Zeit, November
1946. I hope to evaluate the views of these writers on another occasion.

COLLECTIVE GUILT

The Holy Father, it would seem, intended to draw us
away from mere accusations and to direct our attention to
the social forces which govern the world of today. Certainly,
he is not a determinist. He knows that the task of regaining
the mastery of our world is not hopeless, and that, in-fact,
by studying the social forces which are shaping our destiny
we may learn to direct them. "Social control" in the proper
sense of the word is the need; it means that after we have
ascertained the consequences which certain political " or
economic decisions are likely to entail, we concentrate our
efforts on promoting the success of those which have desirable consequences, and try to block the others. If there is a
collective responsibility, it consists in our obligation to marshal our strength for this task. If we fail, the blind forces
now raging in such a large part of the world under a tyranny
of a different color will engulf more countries as time goes
on. Wherever such a system prevails it will, for the single
reason that not all human beings are either heroes or saints,
make criminals of many people who under ordinary circumstances might have been good citizens. These people
would then be entitled to say with Goethe: "You let the
poor fellow become guilty, and then you abandon him to
pain.")40
FerdinandA. Hermens.

89 Explicit reference to political systems was made by the Holy Father in
his famous Christmas message of 1944, in which he emphasized that World War
11, begun by dictatorships, would have been unlikely had the will of the people
been freely expressed, as is the case in an orderly democracy.
n
40 "Ihr lasst den Armen schuldig werden, und ilberlasst ihn dann der Pein.

